Representative Work

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; John Joseph Parnofiello, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502024CA010447XXXAMB.

Larry Elliot Klayman, Boca Raton, pro se. Rachel Elise Fugate and Yelan Escalona of Shullman Fugate PLLC,

Tampa, for appellees.

SHEPHERD, J.

Appellant, Larry Klayman, seeks review of the circuit court’s (1) order granting appellees’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint and determining entitlement to attorney’s fees, and (2) order denying Klayman’s motion for rehearing. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Facts

Klayman initially filed a defamation action against Portfolio Media, Inc. (d/b/a Law360), Khorri Atkinson, and Hailey Konnath (collectively, the “Media Defendants”). The defamation action was based on six allegedly defamatory statements published in Law360 articles concerning Klayman’s disciplinary proceedings and suspension from the practice of law in Washington, D.C. One statement reported that a circuit judge had described the issue before another judge as whether Klayman had “committed fraud” when the judge had, in fact, said “withdrew.” The Media Defendants asserted thatthis statement resulted from a transcription error and was corrected after publication.

The Media Defendants moved to dismiss the defamation complaint, arguing that most statements were protected by the fair-report privilege, and no statements were defamatory or published with actual malice. Following a hearing, the initial circuit court (“Defamation Court”) dismissed the action with prejudice, concluding that five statements were privileged and the remaining statement was not defamatory as a matter of law. We affirmed the dismissal. More than two years later, Klayman filed the present action under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 against the Media Defendants and their counsel (collectively, the “appellees”). The complaint alleged that the appellees committed fraud on the court by arguing in the defamation case that the disputed statement was a transcription error and not made with actual malice. The appellees moved to dismiss, asserting that the claim was time- barred and substantively deficient. Klayman filed an amended complaint adding allegations that the alleged fraud led to a subsequent attorney’s fees award. The appellees again moved to dismiss, citing Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute as an additional basis for relief.

The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the alleged misconduct constituted intrinsic fraud subject to rule 1.540’s one-year limitation, the claim lacked substantive merit, and the action violated the anti-SLAPP statute. The circuit court found the appellees entitled to attorney’s fees and denied rehearing. This appeal followed.

Discussion

We review an order granting a motion to dismiss de novo. Edwards v. Landsman, 51 So. 3d 1208, 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). “In reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss . . . [an appellate] court may not go beyond the four corners of the complaint and must accept the facts alleged therein and exhibits attached as true.” Swerdlin v. Fla. Mun. Ins. Tr., 162 So. 3d 96, 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Edwards, 51 So. 3d at 1213).

I. Rule 1.540’s Procedural Requirements Klayman first argues that his rule 1.540 action was not procedurally improper and, therefore, not time-barred.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(3) permits relief from a final judgment based on fraud, but requires that such claims be raised within one year of the challenged judgment. Although courts retain authority to entertain independent actions for fraud upon the court, that remedy is limited to cases involving extrinsic fraud. See Parker v. Parker, 950 So. 2d 388, 392 (Fla. 2007); DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. 1984)

(“[O]nly extrinsic fraud may constitute fraud on the court.”), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Lefler v. Lefler, 776 So. 2d 319, 322 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

Florida courts distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic fraud based on whether the alleged conduct prevented a party from fully presenting a case. Extrinsic fraud occurs where a party is deprived of the opportunity to participate in the proceeding. See Parker, 950 So. 2d at 391; Voce v.

Wachovia Mortg., 174 So. 3d 545, 548 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Fair v. Tampa Elec. Co., 27 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 1946); NAFH Nat’l Bank v. Aristizabal, 117 So. 3d 900, 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Greenwich Ass’n, Inc. v. Greenwich Apartments, Inc., 979 So. 2d 1116, 1118 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008);

Se. Bank, N.A. v. Almeida, 693 So. 2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). To establish extrinsic fraud, or “fraud on the court,” the alleged misconduct must go to the case’s core issue and be supported by clear and convincing evidence of an unconscionable scheme designed to interfere with the judicial process. See, e.g., Beselear v. Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 291 So. 3d 137, 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). We have stated:

[T]he extreme sanction of dismissal [for fraud on the court] should be imposed only where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier [of fact] or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim of defense. The scheme must go to the very core issue at trial.

Gilbert v. Eckerd Corp. of Fla., Inc., 34 So. 3d 773, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (internal and external citations omitted); cf. Bob Montgomery Real Est. v. Djokic, 858 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (reversing dismissal where evidence of misconduct was “tenuous and conflicting”); Bertrand v.Belhomme, 892 So. 2d 1150, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (reversing dismissal where the record did not establish an intent to deceive or willful bad faith).

“[I]ntrinsic fraud, on the other hand, applies to fraudulent conduct that arises within a proceeding and pertains to the issues in the case that have been tried or could have been tried.” Parker, 950 So. 2d at 391 (citation

omitted); Johnson v. Wells, 73 So. 188, 191 (Fla. 1916); Wescott v. Wescott, 444 So. 2d 495, 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Such matters must be raised within the one-year limitation enumerated in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). See Arrieta-Gimenez v. Arrieta-Negron, 551 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 1989); Guerriero v. Schaub, 579 So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

Here, the alleged misconduct—the appellees’ litigation position regarding a transcription error and lack of actual malice—occurred entirely within the defamation proceeding and addressed issues squarely before the Defamation Court. Klayman actively participated in that proceeding, presented argument, and received an adverse ruling on the merits. The limitation or denial of discovery occurring after the lawsuit was dismissed also does not transform intrinsic fraud into extrinsic fraud. The record reflects that the Defamation Court correctly dismissed the defamation action on legal grounds, concluding that the claims failed as a matter of law. These circumstances confirm that Klayman was not deprived of his day in court. See Almeida, 693 So. 2d at 1020.

Because the allegations concern intrinsic fraud, rule 1.540(b)’s one-year limitation applies and renders the allegations untimely. Klayman next contends that his claim is timely because it was filed within one year of subsequent attorney’s fees orders. This argument fails because rule 1.540 measures timeliness from the entry of the challenged judgment, not from later collateral proceedings. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b); see also Lyons Heritage of Tampa, LLC v. Phillips, 385 So. 3d 656, 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Allowing otherwise would undermine the finality of judgments. See Romero v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 209 So. 3d 633, 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).

Accordingly, the circuit court properly dismissed the action as untimely..

II. Anti-SLAPP Statute

1 Klayman also argues that, in addition to timely filing his rule 1.540 motion, he sufficiently alleged fraud in the motion. As discussed above, however, the motion was not timely filed, and we need not address the substantive merit of his intrinsic fraud claims.

4Klayman further argues that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute does not apply as a basis for an award of attorney’s fees. Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute, section 768.295(3), Florida Statutes (2024), prohibits claims that are both “without merit” and brought “primarily because” the opposing party “exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue.” § 768.295(3), Fla. Stat. (2024). The statute was enacted to protect participation in matters of public concern and to provide an expeditious remedy, including mandatory attorney’s fees, when a party is subjected to retaliatory litigation. § 768.295(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (2024). We, and other Florida appellate courts, have emphasized that the statute creates a substantive right not to be burdened by meritless suits targeting protected activity.

See WPB Residents for Integrity in Gov’t, Inc. v. Materio, 284 So. 3d 555, 558–59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019); see also McQueen v. Baskin, 377 So. 3d 170,

175–76 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). Klayman’s claims meet the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute. The conduct giving rise to Klayman’s motion—news reporting on attorney disciplinary proceedings and litigation advocacy—falls within the statute’s definition of protected activity.

The anti-SLAPP statute applies broadly to “any lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim” that targets protected speech, therefore including Klayman’s rule 1.540 motion. § 768.295(3), Fla. Stat. (2024). The statute defines “free speech in connection with public issues” to include statements made before a governmental entity or in connection with issues under its review, as well as statements made in or in connection with news reports and similar expressive works.

§ 768.295(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2024).

Here, the Media Defendants’ publications reported on attorney disciplinary proceedings, matters adjudicated through the judicial branch and implicating the regulation of the legal profession, and therefore constitute speech made in connection with issues under governmental review. Likewise, their counsel’s arguments and filings in defending the defamation action constitute statements made before a governmental entity. Because Klayman’s claim is predicated entirely on that reporting and litigation conduct, it necessarily targets protected activity and was brought “primarily because” of the appellees’ exercise of their constitutional rights within the meaning of the statute. See § 768.295(3),

Fla. Stat. (2024); see also § 768.295(1) (“It is the public policy of this state a person or governmental entity not engage in SLAPP suits because such actions are inconsistent with the right of persons to exercise such constitutional rights of free speech in connection with public issues.”). The circuit court also correctly found that Klayman met the anti-SLAPP statute’s second prong—Klayman’s rule 1.540 motion substantively lacked merit.

Here, Klayman argues that, by asserting that the allegedly defamatory statement resulted from an unintentional transcription mistake, theappellees misled the Defamation Court into finding an absence of actual malice. Klayman’s allegations, however, do not identify facts demonstrating an intent to deceive, willfulness, or bad faith. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Sidran, 140 So. 3d 620, 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Bob Montgomery, 858 So. 2d at 374. Instead, Klayman argues that a transcription error by a notable publication would be “unheard of,” and that the Defamation Court nonetheless relied on this explanation. Such speculation, without supporting factual allegations of deliberate misconduct, is insufficient to establish fraud upon the court. See, e.g.,

Djokic, 858 So. 2d at 374.

Moreover, the premise of Klayman’s complaint is contradicted by the dismissal order in the earlier defamation action. Klayman asserts that the appellees induced the circuit court to find an absence of actual malice. The order, however, does not address actual malice. Rather, the circuit court dismissed the action on the grounds that five of the six statements were protected by the fair-report privilege and that the remaining statement was not defamatory as a matter of law. Because the dismissal rested on privilege and non-defamatory meaning—not actual malice—the challenged ruling did not rely on the appellees’ alleged misrepresentation concerning the transcription error.

Nor does the record indicate that the alleged misrepresentation concerned a central issue underlying the disposition. See Gilbert, 34 So. 3d at 775 (“The scheme must go to the very core issue at trial.”). Because the dismissal rested on legal grounds unrelated to actual malice, the alleged transcription-error explanation could not have been dispositive.

Id.2 Klayman suggests that the anti-SLAPP statute’s “without merit” requirement is equivalent to the “frivolous” requirement for imposing sanctions under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2024). A claim, however, may lack legal merit even if not sanctionable under section 57.105. See, e.g., Flynn v. Wilson, 398 So. 3d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024); see also Mastandrea v. Snow, 333 So. 3d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).

Accordingly, the allegations do not establish fraud on the court but instead reflect an attempt to relitigate issues previously resolved adversely to Klayman. Because the claim is both meritless and directed at protected activity, the anti-SLAPP statute applies. The statute supports an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.

We affirm the order dismissing the amended complaint and determining appellees’ entitlement to attorney’s fees.

Affirmed.

LEVINE and FORST, JJ., concur.

Obtained dismissal and appellate affirmance of a Hollywood producer’s defamation suit regarding The Hollywood Reporter’s article about the plaintiff’s public feud with a former colleague.

The Southern District of Florida, as affirmed by the 11th Circuit on appeal, found that the plaintiff’s suit was precluded under Florida’s borrowing statute. Specifically, because the at-issue defamation claim arose in California (where the relationship between the two producers was centered), Florida law required that California’s one-year statute of limitations must apply (rather than Florida’s two-year statute), rendering the complaint time-barred

Middleton v. The Hollywood Reporter, LLC,  Case No. Case No. 23-12979 (11th Cir. 2025)

Obtained access to inspection reports for maternity homes registered by the Florida Association of Christian Child Caring Agencies (“FACCCA”) as part of The Times’ reporting on oversight of residential child-caring agencies in the State of Florida. The trial court found that FACCCA had been delegated a function of the Department of Children and Families and is therefore subject to Florida’s Public Records Act. The New York Times Company et al. v. Florida Association of Christian Child Caring Agencies, Case No. 2024-CA-006754 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. 2025).

Successfully persuaded the Florida Supreme Court, via an amicus brief, to adopt an appellate rule change to permit immediate interlocutory appeal of denied anti-SLAPP motions. The previous year, the Court had rejected the proposed change but then changed its mind on the matter during a subsequent proceeding, after additional briefing and oral argument. Because Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute demonstrates a legislative intent to resolve SLAPP suits “expeditiously”—in that the pendency of such suits infringe on First Amendment rights—the Court ultimately amended the rules to align with the legislators’ goal of disposing SLAPP suits as quickly as possible.  Vericker v.  Powell, Case No. SC2022-1042 (Fla. March 27, 2025)

Obtained a dismissal with prejudice in favor of LinkedIn, where one of its users alleged that she was “deplatformed” for sharing misinformation. The Court granted LinkedIn’s motion, agreeing that LinkedIn was not an employment agency subject to discrimination claims. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege any cause of action against LinkedIn and denied Plaintiff’s request to temporarily reinstate her suspended account. Gundogdu v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 0:23-cv-60804 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2023). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Gundogdu v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 23-12706, 2024 WL 1597781 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 2024).

Obtained anti-SLAPP dismissal of a suit filed by a defamation plaintiff who responded to losing a prior defamation suit by re-suing the defendants from the prior case, as well as their counsel, for alleged fraud on the court because they presented a legal argument with which the plaintiff disagreed.

The court explained that the suit was procedurally barred because Florida’s fraud-on-the-court provision, Civil Rule 1.540, required the plaintiff to file a timely motion within the same court in which the alleged fraud occurred, yet the plaintiff had filed an untimely new suit before another court. The court further held that the claim was substantively baseless—in that no fraud occurred—and constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the findings of the prior defamation suit. The court finally determined that the case violated Florida’s anti-SLAPP law because the plaintiff filed suit in retaliation against the defendants for their constitutionally protected activity of defending themselves in court.

Klayman v. Portfolio Media, Inc., Case No. 50-2024-CA-010447 (15th Jud. Cir. 2024).

Obtained dismissal of an action brought by a travel agency owner for claims of defamation, Florida’s deceptive and unfair trade practices act, and civil conspiracy. The Southern District of Florda, as affirmed by the 11th Circuit, considered the plaintiff’s claims—involving more than 600 allegedly defamatory statements on Facebook—and determined that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the suit. Jastrjembskaia v. Incruises, LLC, Case No. 22-61704 (S.D. Fla. March 29, 2023), aff’d Case No. 23-12601 (11th Cir. Dec. 30, 2024)

Successfully defended legal news publisher in a defamation action that arose from their reporting on legal proceedings. John Doe No. 1 v. Tax Analysts d/b/a Tax Notes et al., Case No. 2023-CA-000483 (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. 2023).

Obtained anti-SLAPP dismissal for Tampa radio station and DJ against a rival DJ’s defamation claims because, the judge explained, the “alleged speech at issue is nothing more than the typical banter expected in the radio industry,” i.e., “back-and-forth exchanges between rival DJs and others in which Plaintiff himself engages.” Mishiyev v. Davis, Case No. 20-CA-8301 (Fla. 13th Jud. Cir. May 20, 2023).

The dismissal came after the Second DCA granted a petition for certiorari finding the trial court erred by dismissing the anti-SLAPP motion without any findings or reasoning. The appellate court reaffirmed the heightened pleading and proof standard to oppose a motion to dismiss under Florida’s anti-SLAPP law, and found “[t]he unelaborated order of dismissal suggests that the trial court denied the motion utilizing an incorrect motion-to-dismiss standard." Davis v. Mishiyev, 339 So. 3d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).

Florida v. Foglesong, Case No. 22-1250 CFA (18th J. Cir. January 18, 2023). Successfully defended against a criminal defendant’s attempt to subpoena journalists’ newsgathering materials. The court denied the defendant’s motion and found that he satisfied none of the three elements required to overcome Florida’s qualified journalists’ privilege.

Bruce Munro and Bruce Munro Ltd. v. Kilburn Live, LLC et al, Case No. 20- 20079 (SDFL)(January 2022). Obtained summary judgment in favor of Defendants on copyright infringement and DMCA claims related to NightGarden, an outdoor light and sound experience in Miami.

In Re Sealed Search Warrant, Case No. 22-MJ-8332-BER (S.D. Fla. 2022). Obtained access to the affidavit and supporting documentation for the search warrant of former President Donald Trump’s home, Mar-a-Lago. The Southern District found that the documents, which concerned an investigation into the former president’s alleged illegal activity in handling classified information, was of great public importance and could not remain fully sealed. The court ordered the United States to release the documents to the public in partially redacted form.

Carroll v. DeLeon, 2021 WL 2224356 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). Obtained affirmance of order granting multiple media defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss that statements in news reports concerning plaintiff’s arrest were reasonably accurate and fair, and therefore protected by Florida’s fair report privilege. The appellate court also found the media defendants were entitled to fees pursuant to Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute.

Baskin v. Royal Goode Prods., LLC, No. 8:21-cv-2558-VMC-TGWn(M.D. Fla. 2021). Obtained report and recommendation denying preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin publication of docu-series. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the action before the report and recommendation was adopted.

Jacoby v. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 21-12030 (11th Cir. 2021). Obtained affirmance of dismissal order where court deemed petition circulator a limited public figure who had failed to adequately allege actual malice.

Smikle v. WFTV, 266 So. 3d 856 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). Obtained affirmance of order granting anti-SLAPP motion for summary judgment that found the reporting on plaintiff’s arrest to be protected opinion, substantially true, without defamatory meaning, and protected by Florida’s fair report privilege. The trial court also issued a final judgment awarding the defendant its trial and appellate fees pursuant to Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute.

MidlevelU, Inc. v. ACI Information Group, Case No. 9:18-cv-80843-BER (S.D. Fla. September 2019). Won $202,500 jury verdict and finding of willful copyright infringement in lawsuit concerning 50 copyrighted works. On March 3, 2021 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment (Case No. 20-10856).

Download relevant files here:
Jury Verdict
Final Judgment
Opinion

Miller v. Gizmodo Media Group, LLC, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-24227-CMA, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145389 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2019). Obtained summary judgment in favor of media defendants on fair report grounds for statements made concerning court document filed in Florida family court proceeding. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

Gubarev v. BuzzFeed, Case No. 17-cv-60426 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2019). Filed a motion to intervene on behalf of The New York Times and obtained an order unsealing court filings in underlying litigation wherein BuzzFeed was sued for libel after it published the Trump “Dossier.” Gubarev v. BuzzFeed order | pdf

Parekh v. CBS Corporation, et al., Case No. 6:18-cv-00466-PGB-TBS (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2019). Obtained affirmance of defamation action based on lack of defamatory meaning and statements not “of and concerning” the plaintiff in connection with news report concerning cancer fraud scheme. Also successfully secured fee award, including determination that rate and total number of hours claimed were reasonable, pursuant to Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute.

• Order Granting Motion to Dismiss
• Report and Recommendation – fees
• Order adopting report and recommendation – fees

Brinkman v. Mitchell-Proffitt, Company, et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-422-MCR-HTC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169374 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2018), adopting report and recommendation, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167778 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2018). Obtained summary judgment in favor of business and individuals in copyright infringement action concerning 24 works of art, and secured fee award, including determination that rate and total number of hours claimed were reasonable, under the Copyright Act, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.

• Order Adopting Report and Recommendation - fees
• Report and Recommendation - fees
• Order Granting Summary Judgment
• Report and Recommendation - summary judgment

Cable News Network, Inc. et al v. School Board of Broward County et al, Case No. 18-004429 (17th Jud. Cir. Fla. 2018); aff’d Case No. 4D18-1335, 1336 (March 2, 2018 Fla. 4th DCA ); writ declined SC18-227 (Fla. Sup. Ct.). Represented a number of intervening media parties in successfully obtaining exterior surveillance footage from Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School evidencing law enforcement response to tragic high school shooting.

Download relevant files:

• CNN v. School Board - Court of Appeal opinion
• CNN v. School Board - Circuit Court opinion

Boling v. WFTV, LLC, et al., Case No. 2017-CA-6488, 2018 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 1860 (Fla. 9th Jud. Cir. Feb. 27, 2018), aff’d, 274 So. 3d 392 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). Convinced appellate court to affirm dismissal of defamation action with prejudice based on failure to comply with Section 770.01, Florida Statutes. The appellate court also affirmed the defendant’s entitlement to attorney’s fees pursuant to Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute. Order Dismissing Case with Prejudice

Harrouff v. State, Case No. 4D17-575 (Fla. 4th DCA. Feb. 27, 2017). Successfully obtained access in trial court to discovery material containing interview given by murder defendant to syndicated talk show and denial of defendant's petition for certiorari review in the appellate court. Harrouff v. State Circuit Court Opinion | pdf | Harrouff v. State District Court of Appeal Opinion | pdf

ABC, Inc. v. City of Orlando, Case No. 2016-CA-005528-O, 2016-CA-005536-O (9th Jud. Cir. Fla. Nov. 10, 2016). Secured for a nationwide media consortium access to hundreds of 9-1-1 recordings from inside an Orlando, Florida nightclub during largest mass shooting in U.S. history. ABC, Inc. v. City of Orlando Circuit Court order | pdf

Kronk v. Am. Media, Inc., Case No. 5D15-1529, 2016 WL 3570466 (Fla. 5th DCA June 28, 2016). Convinced appellate court to affirm partial dismissal and partial summary judgment in favor of publisher on privilege and lack of defamatory meaning grounds in a defamation case pertaining to client's reporting on the high profile prosecution of Casey Anthony.

Salvani v. ADVFN PLC, 628 Fed. Appx. 784 (2d Cir. 2015). Convinced Second Circuit Court of Appeal to affirm dismissal of claims under the Securities Exchange Act against a website publisher.

Medytox et al. v. InvestorsHub.com, 152 So.3d 727 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Convinced appellate court to affirm dismissal of defamation claim based upon client’s immunity as an internet service provider under the Communications Decency Act, and successfully argued in Florida Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court to deny further review.

Angelastro v. Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 145 So. 3d 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Obtained affirmance of order granting summary judgment to newspaper defendant in a defamation suit on fair report grounds.

Bainter v. League of Women Voters of Florida, 150 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. 2014). Successfully represented national coalition of media parties before the Florida Supreme Court in friend-of-the-court capacity seeking access to sealed evidence considered by trial court in determining whether state legislature’s redistricting plan was constitutional.

Ocean World, S.A. v. O’Barry (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2007-2014). Successfully defended clients in four defamation and tortious interference cases that arose from clients’ advocacy against importation of wild dolphins into amusement park. During course of proceedings, protected clients from improper financial discovery. O’Barry v. Ocean World, S.A., 17 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Martinick et al v. Media Visions, Case No. 13-61148, 2013 WL 12049083 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2013). Obtained denial of preliminary injunction and dismissal of complaint alleging unfair competition under the Lanham Act.

Grund v. Am. Media, Inc., 117 So. 3d 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Convinced appellate court to affirm summary judgment in favor of publisher on privilege grounds in a defamation case pertaining to client’s reporting on the high profile prosecution of Casey Anthony.

Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 2013). Successfully defended reporter subpoena in death penalty proceeding.

Stotler v. Orlando Hearst Television Inc., 92 So. 3d 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Obtained summary judgment on fair reports grounds for statements made against suspect who was never arrested or charged.

Investorshub.com, Inc. v. Mina Mar Group, Inc., Case No. 4:11cv9–RH/WS, 2011 WL 12506239 (N.D. Fla. June 20, 2011). Obtained stipulated final judgment declaring Canadian defamation judgment invalid under the Speech Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4105, in what is widely considered the first decision of its kind under the Act.

National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Associated Press, 18 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Successfully litigated and argued Florida Public Records Act case against Florida State University and the NCAA for access to documents stored on secure NCAA server related to a cheating scandal at the University.

Epstein v. State, 16 So.3d 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Obtained information contained in federal plea agreement in high profile criminal case under Florida’s Public Records Act.

Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008). On behalf of a consortium of media companies, convinced Florida Supreme Court that Florida should refuse to recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy.

Casita, L.P. v. Maplewood Equity Partners, L.P., 960 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). Successfully obtained reversal of trial court’s decision to exercise personal jurisdiction in a defamation and tortious interference case based on non-resident defendants’ alleged statements published outside of the state.

Sun-Sentinel Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 489 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2007). Argued and won Freedom of Information Act case to obtain addresses of people requesting FEMA assistance after 2004 hurricanes.

Quade v. Entertainment Events, Inc. (Amer. Arb. Ass'n, Case No. 13 140 Y 00169 07). Won one-million dollar breach-of-contract verdict in arbitration for producer of off-Broadway plays.

Lusczynski v. Tampa Bay Television (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2006). Won jury verdict for Tampa television station and its journalist in defamation and false light case brought by three police officers.

Universal Communications Sys., Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., Case No. No. 05-20047-CIV, 2006 WL 950037 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2006). Secured fee award, including determination that rate and total number of hours claimed were reasonable, for media organization under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in connection with frivolous defamation action brought against CNN and journalist Wolf Blitzer.

Sarasota Herald-Tribune v. State, 916 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Invalidated trial court order prohibiting publication of juror names and prohibiting photographing jurors as prior restraint.

In re Records of Dep’t of Children and Family Services, 873 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Obtained access to DCF records for newspaper client and clarified good-cause standard for obtaining confidential DCF records.